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Abstract Automated verification of operating system
kernels is a challenging problem, partly due to the use
of shared mutable data structures. In this paper, we
show how we can automatically verify memory safety
and functional correctness properties of the task sched-
uler component of the FreeRTOS kernel using the ver-
ification system Hip/Sleek. We show how some of
Hip/Sleek features like user-defined predicates and
lemmas make the specifications highly expressive and
the verification process viable. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first code-level verification of mem-
ory safety and functional correctness properties of the
FreeRTOS scheduler. The outcome of our experiment
confirms that Hip/Sleek can indeed be used to ver-
ify code that is used in production. Moreover, since the
properties that we verify are quite general, we envis-
age that the same approach can be adopted to verify
components of other operating systems.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the number of embedded devices in the
marketplace has increased substantially due to signifi-
cant reductions in size and costs of microprocessors. As
a result, the safety of the real-time operating systems
(RTOSs) that are traditionally used by embedded de-
vices is becoming increasingly important. The industry
has already recognised the importance of providing safe
and reliable RTOSs [2] and the academic community is
actively working on tools and methods that can improve
the current standards of software quality. In particular,
the advances in theory and tool support have inspired
industrial and academic researchers to join up in an in-
ternational Grand Challenge (GC) in Verified Software
[13,15]. In the context of this international challenge,
Jim Woodcock proposed the verification of FreeRTOS
[1], a real-time, multitasking, preemptive operating sys-
tem for embedded devices [33]. However, as Woodcock
points out, FreeRTOS involves lots of pointers and the
automatic verification of heap-manipulating programs
is challenging [30]. For that reason, Woodcock suggests
the use of separation logic [29], which supports reason-
ing about shared mutable data structures.
In this paper, we take the FreeRTOS kernel as a case
study and show how we can automatically verify the
memory safety and functional correctness of its main
component: the task scheduler. We use the verification
system Hip/Sleek, which allows the combination of
both separation (i.e. shape) and numerical (e.g. size)
information. Hip/Sleek also allows user-specified in-
ductive predicates to appear in program specifications,
making the specifications highly expressive. We only
consider partial correctness: we prove, for example, that
the next task chosen by the scheduler is the task that
should be executed, but we do not guarantee that the
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task will eventually be chosen (i.e., temporal properties
and other properties like thread safety on shared mu-
table data structures are not considered). To the best
of our knowledge, we provide the first code-level ver-
ification of memory safety and functional correctness
properties of the FreeRTOS scheduler.
We start in Section 2 by describing how FreeRTOS
is structured and by explaining what are the main data
structures involved in scheduling. In Section 3 we give
an overview of the Hip/Sleek verification system, and
in Section 4, we give an overview of the specification
and verification process, focusing in particular on, how
the main data structures used in the FreeRTOS sched-
uler are modelled and how relevant properties of func-
tional correctness and memory safety are specified. In
Section 5, we discuss related work. We finish in Section
6 with a discussion on what was achieved, on what we
have learnt from this experience, and on what we have
planned for the next steps. We also discuss briefly the
main challenges that we foresee.
2 FreeRTOS
FreeRTOS [1] is a real-time, multitasking, preemptive
operating system for embedded devices. The most im-
portant concept in FreeRTOS is the concept of task.
Each executing program is a task under the control of
the operating system (some operating systems use the
term process). In the presence of multiple tasks, the op-
erating system has to decide which task to execute at
any particular time. The part of the kernel responsi-
ble for switching tasks is the scheduler. FreeRTOS uses
a fixed-priority scheduling policy, ensuring that at any
given time, the processor executes the highest priority
task of all those tasks that are currently ready to exe-
cute1. Among other properties, the scheduler also has
to guarantee that only tasks that are ready to execute
are actually executed.
FreeRTOS2 is written mostly in the C programming
language, with a few assembler functions that take care
of architecture-specific details. There are four main C
files that represent the kernel of FreeRTOS. FreeRTOS
source code is distributed under a free software license
and is structured as shown in Figure 1. Most of the
architecture-independent code is in the Source direc-
tory. The file tasks.c implements most of the sched-
1 Note that FreeRTOS does not guarantee any deadlines
for the execution of tasks. The only guarantee is that the
highest priority task that is ready to execute will run as soon
as possible.
2 The work described in this paper is based on version 6.1.1
of FreeRTOS. Have in mind that the data structures and the
algorithms involved may have changed since that version.
Fig. 1 Structure of FreeRTOS Source Code
uler functionalities, making use of the structures and
functions defined in the file list.c. The file queue.c im-
plements thread-safe queues that are used for inter-
task communication and synchronisation. The file crou-
tine.c implements coroutines, which are very simple and
lightweight tasks that make a very limited use of stack.
In this paper, we focus on the methods defined in the
files tasks.c and list.c. FreeRTOS supports many dif-
ferent architectures; the architecture-dependent code is
in the directory portable. Although memory allocation
and deallocation are specifically defined for some of the
architectures, the directory MemMang contains several
C implementations that are portable for most of the
architectures.
2.1 Data structures
Lists FreeRTOS provides a list API that is designed
for the scheduler needs, but that can also be used by
application code. Lists are a key part of the scheduler,
because they are used to organise tasks; for example,
the scheduler maintains a list of tasks ready to execute
and a list of tasks that are blocked. The data struc-
ture representing lists is called xList and is defined as
follows:
typedef struct xLIST {
volat i le unsigned portBASE TYPE
uxNumberOfItems ;
volat i le xList I tem ∗ pxIndex ;
volat i le xMiniListItem xListEnd ;
} xL i s t ;
A list consists of a structure with three fields: the num-
ber of items in the list (uxNumberOfItems), a pointer
to a list item (pxIndex ), and a (mini) list item that con-
tains the maximum possible item value, which is used
Automated Verification of the FreeRTOS Scheduler in Hip/Sleek 3
as a marker (xListEnd). The type portBASE TYPE is
architecture dependent; in the context of this paper, it
can be viewed as an unsigned integer. Note that lists
only store pointers to structures of the type xListItem,
whose definition is:
struct xLIST ITEM {
portTickType xItemValue ;
volat i le struct xLIST ITEM ∗ pxNext ;
volat i le struct xLIST ITEM ∗ pxPrevious ;
void ∗ pvOwner ;
void ∗ pvContainer ;
} ;
typedef struct xLIST ITEM xList I tem ;
Each list item holds a value (xItemValue), a pointer
to the object (normally a task) that contains the list
item (pvOwner), a pointer to the list in which the list
item is placed (pvContainer), a pointer to the previous
list item (pxPrevious), and a pointer to the next list
item (pxNext). The existence of the pointers pxPrevious
and pxNext suggests that lists are doubly-linked. As we
will see later (Section 4), lists are indeed cyclic doubly-
linked lists. Note that the end marker, xListEnd, is a
structure of the type xMiniListItem; the only difference
between this structure and the structure xListItem is
the omission of the fields pvOwner and pvContainer.
The List API provides the following five public func-
tions:
void v L i s t I n i t i a l i s e ( xL i s t ∗ pxList ) ;
void v L i s t I n i t i a l i s e I t e m ( xList I tem ∗pxItem ) ;
void v L i s t I n s e r t ( xL i s t ∗pxList ,
xList I tem ∗pxNewListItem ) ;
void vLi s t Inse r tEnd ( xL i s t ∗pxList ,
xList I tem ∗pxNewListItem ) ;
void vListRemove ( xList I tem ∗pxItemToRemove ) ;
The function vListInitialise initialises all the mem-
bers of an xList structure. This function must be called
before a list is used. After initialisation, the pointer
pxIndex points to the field xListEnd, which is the only
element of the list. Regarding the field xListEnd, its
field xItemValue is set to the maximum possible value
(portMAX DELAY ) and its pointers pxNext and px-
Previous are set to point to itself. As a result, the list
can be seen as a doubly-linked list of size 1 (note, how-
ever, that the first field, uxNumberOfItems, contains the
value 0, which is the number of elements different from
the end marker). Figure 2 illustrates the state of a list
immediately after initialisation. The three xList fields
are laid out horizontally; the first holds the value of the
variable uxNumberOfItems, which is zero; the second
holds the pointer pxIndex ; the third holds a structure
of type xMiniListItem.
Fig. 2 xList structure after initialisation
The function vListInitialiseItem sets the container
of the given item to NULL, guaranteeing that the item
is not recorded as being on a list. The function vListIn-
sert inserts an item into a list in ascending item value
order. Figure 3 illustrates how the list shown in Figure
2 would like if an xListItem A was inserted into it (we
omit the pointer pxList for simplicity).
If an xListItem B with an item value greater than
A’s item value was to be inserted into the list shown in
Figure 3, then it would be placed after A, as illustrated
in Figure 4. Note how insertion guarantees that the
doubly-linked list is cyclic.
The function vListInsertEnd inserts an item into a
list at the position following the item pointed by pxIn-
dex. Its definition is shown in Figure 5.
Note how pxIndex is changed to point to the item that
was just inserted. The relevance of vListInsertEnd will
become apparent later, when we explain how the sched-
uler determines which task to run next. Suppose that
we have the list shown in Figure 3 and we insert an
xListItem B with an item value greater than A’s item
value using the function vListInsertEnd. Figure 6 illus-
trates the resulting list. Note how the pointer pxIndex
is updated. The relevance of this function will become
apparent later, when we explain how the scheduler de-
termines which task to run.
Fig. 3 xList structure after insertion of the xListItem A
Fig. 4 xList structure after insertion of the xListItem B
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void vLi s t Inse r tEnd ( xL i s t pxList ,
xList I tem pxNewListItem )
{
xList I tem pxIndex ;
/∗ I n s e r t a new l i s t item i n t o pxLis t , but
r a t h e r than s o r t the l i s t , makes the new
l i s t item the l a s t item to be removed by a
c a l l to pvListGetOwnerOfNextEntry . This
means i t has to be the item pointed to by
the pxIndex member .
∗/
pxIndex = pxList . pxIndex ;
pxNewListItem . pxNext = pxIndex . pxNext ;
pxNewListItem . pxPrevious = pxList . pxIndex ;
( pxIndex . pxNext ) . pxPrevious = pxNewListItem ;
pxIndex . pxNext = pxNewListItem ;
pxList . pxIndex = pxNewListItem ;
/∗ Remember which l i s t the item i s in . ∗/
pxNewListItem . pvContainer = pxList ;
( pxList . uxNumberOfItems)++;
}
Fig. 5 Definition of the function vListInsertEnd
Fig. 6 xList structure after insertion of the xListItem B (us-
ing vListInsertEnd)
Finally, the function vListRemove removes an item
from a list, updating the pointer pxIndex if necessary.
For example, if we remove the item B from the list
shown in Figure 6, we get the list shown in Figure 3
(pxIndex is set to point to the previous item in the
list).
Tasks In FreeRTOS, a task is represented by a task
control block (TCB). TCBs are defined as shown in Fig-
ure 73.
The first two fields of a TCB are related with the task’s
stack: pxTopOfStack points to the location of the last
item placed on the task’s stack, and pxStack points to
the start of the stack.
Each TCB maintains two fields of the type xLis-
tItem: xGenericListItem is used to place the TCB in
3 To simplify the presentation, we do not include fields spe-
cific to architectures that have a Memory Protection Unit
(MPU), nor fields related with debugging. Also, the order of
the fields has been rearranged.
typedef struct tskTaskControlBlock
{
volat i le portSTACK TYPE ∗pxTopOfStack ;
portSTACK TYPE ∗pxStack ;
xList I tem xGener icLi s t I tem ;
xList I tem xEventListItem ;
unsigned portBASE TYPE uxPr i o r i t y ;
} tskTCB ;
typedef void ∗ xTaskHandle ;
Fig. 7 Definition of task control blocks
Fig. 8 Valid task state transitions (for more details, see [1])
ready and blocked lists, and xEventListItem is used to
place the TCB in event lists. Finally, the field uxPri-
ority represents the priority of the task, where 0 is the
lowest priority.
FreeRTOS creates a special task —the idle task —
when the scheduler starts (i.e., when the function named
vTaskStartScheduler is called). The idle task only exe-
cutes when there are no other tasks able to do so, and
it is responsible for freeing memory for tasks that have
been deleted.
Tasks can be in one of four states:
Running the task is currently using the processor;
Ready the task is ready to execute, but not currently
running because a different task of equal or higher
priority is running;
Blocked the task is waiting for an event. Blocked
tasks are not available for scheduling;
Suspended the task is not available for scheduling.
Tasks will only enter or exit the suspended state
when explicitly commanded to do so.
For completeness, we show in Figure 8 the valid task
state transitions.
Rather than associating with each task a flag ex-
pressing representing its state (e.g., a “Running” flag),
the scheduler maintains several global lists that agglom-
erate tasks that are in the same state.
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2.2 Scheduling
The scheduler starts when the function vTaskStartSched-
uler is called. The kernel can suspend and later resume
a task many times during the task’s lifetime. Because
tasks are unaware of when they are suspended or re-
sumed by the kernel, the scheduler has to guarantee
that upon resumption a task has a context identical to
that immediately prior to its suspension. The process
of saving the context of a task being suspended and
restoring the context of a task being resumed is called
context switching. The context of a task is saved in its
own stack.
The scheduler maintains several global variables that
assist in the scheduling process. For example, the sched-
uler keeps track of the highest priority of which there
are tasks ready to execute (uxTopReadyPriority). It
also uses a pointer to the TCB that is currently run-
ning (pxCurrentTCB) and it maintains an array of lists,
called pxReadyTasksLists, that contains lists of tasks
ready to execute. Each list is associated to a different
priority and the array is sorted in ascending order of pri-
ority; in other words, pxReadyTasksLists[k] is the list of
tasks with priority k that are ready to run. To deter-
mine what is the next task to execute, the scheduler
selects the highest k such that pxReadyTasksLists[k]
is non-empty4, and then uses a round-robin strategy.
The next code listing shows how these pxCurrentTCB
and pxReadyTasksLists are defined. The variable config-
MAX PRIORITIES represents the maximum number
of priorities that can be used.
stat ic volat i le unsigned portBASE TYPE
uxTopReadyPriority ;
tskTCB ∗ volat i le pxCurrentTCB = NULL;
stat ic xL i s t pxReadyTasksLists [
configMAX PRIORITIES ] ;
We now explain the dynamics of the FreeRTOS sched-
uler using a simple example. To simplify the presenta-
tion, we assume that we only have one list of tasks that
are ready to execute (of priority tskIDLE PRIORITY );
also, we assume that the list has been initialized and is
in the state shown in Figure 2.
Adding new tasks Suppose that two tasks, A and B,
are created. The function that creates the tasks also
adds them to the list of tasks ready to execute, us-
ing a function called prvAddTaskToReadyQueue. This
4 Here we use the term non-empty to qualify a list that has
at least one TCB; that is, we do not consider xListEnd as a
list item.
function uses vListInsertEnd to add the tasks and, if
necessary, it updates the variable uxTopReadyPriority.
Hence, the state shown in Figure 2 is changed to the
state shown in Figure 9. Because task B is the last
task to be inserted, pxIndex points to task B’s TCB.
Note how the two TCBs are part of a doubly-linked list
through the field xGenericListItem. Tasks are added to
the list of tasks ready to execute when they are newly
created or when they become unblocked.
Fig. 9 pxReadyTasksLists[tskIDLE PRIORITY] after the
creation of tasks A and B
Picking the next task Each time a clock tick is gen-
erated, FreeRTOS saves the context of the task that is
currently running and executes the function vTaskSwitch-
Context. This function selects the highest priority list
that contains at least one task ready to execute. Once
the list is identified, the task that follows the pointer
pxIndex is chosen to run. The function responsible for
that is listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY 5, which
is shown in Figure 10.
Before, we mentioned that the function vListInsertEnd
was relevant to the way in which the scheduler deter-
mines which task to run at a particular time. Indeed,
given that the scheduler uses the macro named list-
GET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY to determine which
task to execute next, an invariant of the scheduling pro-
cess is:
For each list of ready tasks with the same priority,
the TCB pointed by pxIndex will be the last one to ex-
ecute.
5 In fact, listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY is defined
as a C macro, but we define it here as a function. Also, we use
Hip’s notation so that the reader can see an example of a Hip
program. Note that we use a dot for accessing fields, rather
than C’s arrow notation ->. We also use the keyword ref to
express that the value of pxTCB is returned by reference.
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void listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY
( r e f tskTCB pxTCB, xL i s t pxList )
{
xL i s t pxConstList = pxList ;
/∗ Increment the index to the next item and
return the item , ensuring we don ’ t
re turn the marker used at the end o f
the l i s t .
∗/
pxConstList . pxIndex =
( pxConstList . pxIndex ) . pxNext ;
i f ( pxConstList . pxIndex==
pxConstList . xListEnd )
{
pxConstList . pxIndex =
( pxConstList . pxIndex ) . pxNext ;
}
pxTCB = ( pxConstList . pxIndex ) . pvOwner ;
}
Fig. 10 listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY is used to
switch executing tasks
(This is a consequence of using a cyclic-doubly linked
list.) Since the function vListInsertEnd sets pxIndex to
point to the newly inserted TCB, this will be the last
one to execute.
Going back to the example illustrated in Figure 9,
we can see that the scheduler would choose task A to
run, since it follows the task pointed by pxIndex. More-
over, the macro listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY
would change pxIndex to point to task A. So, if no tasks
are added nor removed from the list before the next ex-
ecution of listGET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY, the
next task to run will be task B.
Removing tasks In case a task blocks or is destroyed,
function vListRemove is used to remove the task from
the list of tasks that are ready to execute.
3 The Hip/Sleek Verification System
The Hip/Sleek verification system developed by Chin
et al. [8,23] is aimed at automatic verification of mem-
ory safety and functional correctness of heap-manipulating
programs. The front-end of the system is the Hoare-
style forward verifier Hip, which takes user-defined pred-
icates, program code, and program specifications (loop
invariants, method pre/post) as input, and invokes a
set of forward reasoning rules to symbolically execute
the program (starting from the initial abstract state
specified by the precondition). The backend entailment
prover Sleek is used to automatically prove formulae
entailment (proof obligations generated by Hip during
Pre/PostProgram Code
Shape 
Predicates Lemmas
User Supplied Items
HIP: Hoare-style 
Forward Verifier
SLEEK: Entailment
Prover
The HIP/SLEEK Verification System
Fig. 11 Overview of Hip/Sleek
its forward verification). Key scenarios where Sleek is
invoked include (1) systematically check that the pre-
condition is satisfied at each call site, and (2) the post-
condition is successfully verified for each method defi-
nition against the given precondition. Proof obligations
related with the numeric domain are discharged to ex-
ternal automatic provers (e.g. MONA [16]).
The overall structure of Hip/Sleek is shown in Fig-
ure 11. In what follows, we shall illustrate user-defined
shape predicates via examples, and briefly introduce
the Hip verifier and the Sleek prover. The advanced
feature about lemmas is delayed to a later section.
3.1 User-defined predicates
For better flexibility and expressivity, Hip/Sleek al-
lows users to define inductive shape predicates to lever-
age both shape and pure properties and to capture their
desired level of program correctness (to be verified). For
example, with a singly-linked list structure defined as
data node { int val; node next; }
a user interested in pointer-safety may define a list
shape predicate (as in [7,11]):
list(root)≡ (root=null)∨
(∃i, q · root7→node(i, q)∗list(q))
Note that in the inductive case, the separation conjunc-
tion ∗ (for more information about separation logic, see
[29]) ensures that two heap portions (the head node
and the tail list) are domain-disjoint. The parameter
root for the predicate is the root pointer referring to
the data structure.
Hip/Sleek allows the use of numerical information
in shape predicates. This means that if the user is in-
terested in tracking also the length of a list to anal-
yse quantitative measures, the following shape predi-
cate can be defined
ll(root, n)≡ (root=null∧n=0)∨
(root7→node( , q)∗ll(q, m)∧n=m+1)
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Note that unbound variables, such as q and m, are im-
plicitly existentially quantified, and is used to denote
an existentially quantified anonymous variable. This
predicate may be changed to capture information about
the content of lists, to support a higher level of correct-
ness with a multi-set (bag) property:
llB(root, S)≡ (root=null∧S=∅)∨
(root7→node(v, q)∗llB(q, S1)∧S={v}unionsqS1)
The length of the list is implicitly captured by the cardi-
nality |S|. The operator unionsq denotes bag union. A further
strengthening can capture also the sortedness property:
sllB(root, S)≡ (root=null∧S=∅)∨
(root 7→node(v, q)∗sllB(q, S1)∧
S={v}unionsqS1∧(∀x∈S1·v≤x))
Therefore, users can provide predicate definitions
with respect to various correctness levels and program
properties, which can be as simple as normal lists or as
complicated as AVL trees, depending on their require-
ments. These predicates are non-trivial to be defined
but can be reused multiple times for specifications of
different methods. Hence, efforts involved in such pred-
icate design are often significantly amortised.
User-defined shape predicates can be used to spec-
ify program specifications such as loop invariants and
method specifications. For instance, in Figure 12, the
predicates llB and sllB are used to specify the meth-
ods insert sort and insert (Line 3, 4, 12, 13):
1 data node { int val; node next; }
2 node insert_sort(node x)
3 requires llB(x, S) ∧ |S|≥1
4 ensures sllB(res, T) ∧ T=S
5 { if (x.next == null) return x;
6 else { node s = x.next;
7 node r = insert_sort(s);
8 return insert(r, x);
9 }
10 }
11 node insert(node r, node x) {
12 requires sllB(r, S)∗x7→node(v, )
13 ensures sllB(res, T) ∧ T=Sunionsq{v}
14 if (r == null) {
15 x.next = null; return x;
16 } else if (x.val <= r.val) {
17 x.next = r; return x;
18 } else {
19 r.next = insert(r.next, x);
20 return r;
21 }
22 }
Fig. 12 The insertion sort program for lists.
spred ::= c〈v∗〉 ≡ Φ inv pi
mspec ::= requires Φpr ; ensures Φpo
Φ ::=
∨
(∃v∗·κ∧pi)∗
pi ::= γ∧φ
γ ::= v1=v2 | v=null | v1 6=v2 | v 6=null | γ1∧γ2
κ ::= emp | v::c〈v∗〉 | κ1 ∗ κ2
∆ ::= Φ | ∆1∨∆2 | ∆∧pi | ∆1∗∆2 | ∃v·∆
φ ::= ϕ | b | a | φ1∧φ2 | φ1∨φ2 | ¬φ | ∃v · φ | ∀v · φ
a ::=s1=s2 | s1≤s2
b ::=true | false | v | b1=b2
s ::= kint | v | kint×s | s1+s2 | −s | max(s1,s2)
| min(s1,s2) | |B|
ϕ ::= v∈B | B1=B2 | B1@B2 | ∀v∈B·φ | ∃v∈B·φ
B ::= B1unionsqB2 | B1uB2 | B1−B2 | {} | {v}
Fig. 13 The specification language
For completeness, we include the grammar that de-
fines the syntax of inductive shape predicates (spred)
in Figure 13.
3.2 The Hip System
Hip is a separation logic based automated verification
system for a C-like imperative language, able to mod-
ularly verify heap-manipulating programs. The system
can handle programs with complex data structures. It
accepts abstract descriptions for such structures in the
form of inductive predicates shown in the previous sub-
section.
The grammar of the C-like imperative language sup-
ported by Hip is shown in Figure 14. A program com-
prises a list of type declarations (tdecl∗) and a list of
method declarations (meth∗). We use the superscript
∗ to denote a list of items; for example v∗ denotes a
list of variables, v1, .., vn. With regard to the termi-
nal symbols, c denotes the name of a user-defined data
type, v, v1, v2 stand for variable names, mn represents
a method name, k is a numeric constant, and f denotes
a field name. The language supports data type dec-
laration via datat, and shape predicate definition via
spred.
Given annotations for each method/loop with one
or more pre/post conditions, the Hip verifier constructs
a set of obligations in the form of implication checks
(entailments) between pairs of formulae which are then
sent to the backend Sleek prover to be discharged.
Note that method specifications are denoted as mspec
in Figure 13. The formulae Φpr and Φpo in the method
specification “requires Φpr; ensures Φpo” denote the
precondition and postcondition of the method, respec-
tively. The specification language allows rich specifi-
cations that contain both heap constraints expressed
as separation logic formulae and several different logic
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P ::= tdecl∗ meth∗
tdecl ::= datat | spred
datat ::= data c { field∗ }
field ::= type v
type ::= c | τ
τ ::= int | bool | float | void
meth ::= type mn ((ref type v)∗, (type v)∗) where mspec {e}
e ::= null | kτ | v | v.f | v:=e | v1.f :=v2 | new c(v∗)
| e1; e2 | type v; e | mn(v∗) | if (v) e1 else e2
Fig. 14 The core imperative language supported by Hip
fragments like Presburger arithmetic, bags, and lists for
the pure constraints. By making use of set/bag solvers,
the user can also encode reachability conditions as a
set/bag of values that can be collected from some given
data structure. Such conditions are then automatically
discharged by Hip.
The forward verification process conducted by Hip
is essentially a symbolic execution process. Given a Hoare-
style triple {∆1}e{∆2}, the Hip verifier starts from the
abstract pre-state ∆1, symbolically executes the pro-
gram code e to generate an abstract post-state ∆′ and
invokes Sleek to automatically prove that ∆′ entails ∆2.
During the symbolic execution, the Sleek prover may
be invoked many times to discharge generated proof
obligations. The Hip verifier conducts verification in a
modular way, i.e. it verifies each method once against
its specifications. Methods in a program are verified in
a (bottom-up) order according to the program’s call-
dependency graph, starting from the methods in the
leaves of the graph. For each method, the verification
starts from its precondition, computes a post-state by
symbolically executing the method body, and then proves
the generated state entails the expected postcondition.
Once a method is verified against its specifications, when
the method is invoked, the verifier only needs to check
that the abstract state at the call site establishes the
precondition. If it does, it can assume the postcondition
at the end of the method call. A more detailed intro-
duction to the verification process via Hip can be found
at Chin et. al [8].
3.3 The Sleek Prover
The Hip verifier relies on the Sleek prover in order
to discharge verification conditions. Sleek is a fully
automatic prover for separation logic with frame infer-
ring capability. It takes two heap states as input (say
∆A and ∆C) represented by separation formulae, and
checks if one formula ∆A (the antecedent) entails the
other ∆C (the consequent): ∆A ` ∆C∗∆R . The antecedent
may cover more heap states than the consequent, so
a residual heap state (∆R) which represents the frame
condition can be returned by the prover. This resid-
ual heap state will include the pure state of the an-
tecedent. Sleek also supports instantiation of logical
variables that appear during the entailment as existen-
tial variables in the consequent. As part of the implica-
tion check, Sleek discharges the heap obligations (the
obligations pertaining to the shape of data structures)
and translates the remaining pure obligations to pure
constraints that can be discharged by other off-the-shelf
theorem provers. The list of possible pure provers in-
cludes Omega , MONA , CVC Lite, Z3, and Isabelle.
Apart from handling disjunctions and existential quan-
tifiers and dealing with the case when the consequent
formula has an empty heap part, there are three key
steps that may take place in a Sleek proof, namely,
(1) matching up heap nodes/predicates from the an-
tecedent and the consequent, (2) unfolding a shape pred-
icate in the antecedent, and (3) folding against a shape
predicate in the consequent.
As an example, the matching step takes place in the
following entailment proof:
ll(x, n) ∧ n>1 ` ∃m · ll(x, m) ∧ m>0
leading to the pure entailment
n>1 ` n>0
The matching step also takes place in the following
slightly different entailment proof:
ll(x, n) ∧ n>1 ` ll(x, m) ∧ m>0
leading to the pure entailment
n= m ∧ n>1 ` n>0
Note that the underlined part denotes an implicit in-
stantiation of the free variable m.
As an example of the unfolding step, let us look at
the following entailment check:
ll(x, n) ∧ n>1 ` ∃r, m · x 7→node( , r)∗ll(r, m) ∧ m>0
An unfolding to the ll predicate in the antecedent leads
to
∃q · x7→node( , q)∗ll(q, n−1) ∧ n>1
` ∃r, m · x 7→node(,r)∗ll(r, m) ∧ m>0
This can then be handled by two matching steps.
The folding process is more involved and can take
place in two different scenarios: (1) the base case and
(2) the recursive case. An example for the base case is
as follows:
y=null ` ll(y, m) ∧ m=0
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The folding process will try to prove a (different) recur-
sive entailment:
y=null ` y=null ∧ m=0
∨ y 7→node( , r)∗ll(r, m−1)
where in this new entailment, the consequent is the
definition of ll(y, m). Once the new entailment is dis-
charged, the result is returned and the original entail-
ment becomes
y=null ∧ m=0 ` m=0
Note that the underlined part denotes the result re-
turned from the folding process.
An example for the recursive folding process is as
follows:
x7→node( , r) ∧ r=null ` ll(x, n) ∧ n>0
The folding process invokes the following recursive en-
tailment:
x 7→node( , r) ∧ r=null `
x=null ∧ n=0
∨ ∃q, k · x7→node( , q)∗ll(q, k) ∧ k=n−1
where the consequent of this new entailment is the
definition of ll(x, n). This recursive entailment is dis-
charged by a matching process followed by a base case
folding. When it returns, the original entailment be-
comes
r=null ∧ n−1=0 ` n>0
Same as the above, the underlined part denotes the
result obtained from the folding process.
Formal details about the Sleek entailment prov-
ing process can be found at [8]. In the next section,
we present our experience of applying Hip/Sleek to
specify and verify the FreeRTOS scheduler.
4 Specification and Verification
The verification of a scheduler involves many different
types of properties. In this paper, we focus on mem-
ory safety and functional correctness properties. More
specifically, some important properties that we verify
are:
– When tasks become ready to execute (newly cre-
ated tasks, or recently unblocked tasks), the sched-
uler adds the tasks into the correct position of the
“ready-tasks list”;
– When switching context, the scheduler picks the
right task to execute, i.e., the highest priority task
that is ready to execute;
– When tasks are blocked or removed, the scheduler
does not pick them to run;
– Memory safety: when the scheduler manipulates the
data structures involved in scheduling, their shapes
are maintained and there are no dereferencing of
null pointers6.
One of the main goals of this work is to investi-
gate how we can automatically verify memory safety
and functional correctness properties of a scheduler in
a combined separation and numerical domain. We also
want to test the suitability of the prototype Hip/Sleek
to verify code that is used in production. As a result, our
main challenge is to model the data structures involved
in the scheduling process and annotate FreeRTOS code
with expressive specifications.
4.1 On user-defined predicates
As mentioned in the previous section, one advantage of
Hip/Sleek is the ability to define the shapes of data
structures by separation logic combined with numerical
(e.g. size) and bag (e.g. multi-set of values) information.
Therefore, the specification language is expressive and
powerful to capture not only memory safety properties,
but also functional correctness properties.
For example, the shape of the lists used by the
FreeRTOS scheduler can be captured by the shape pred-
icate XLIST shown below.
XLIST(p) ≡ p7→xList( , i, i) ∗ DLS(i, q, i, q)
∨ p7→xList( , i, e) ∗ DLS(e, e1, i, f1)
∗ DLS(i, f1, e, e1)
Capitalised words refer to shape predicates and xList
is a data node. So, XLIST(p) means that p is a pointer
to a structure of the shape XLIST and a data node of
the shape xList( , i, e) represents an element of the
datatype xList shown in Section 2. The first field cor-
responds to the variable uxNumberOfItems and is left
anonymously defined ( ), since its value is not needed to
define the shape of the structure. The other two fields,
i and e, correspond to the fields pxIndex and xLis-
tEnd, respectively. It is important to note that we are
treating the end marker as a normal xListItem, so that
we can avoid explicit casts (these are not supported
by Hip/Sleek)7. The predicate XLIST is divided in
6 It is important to note that in this work we do not verify
if TCBs’ stack and code pointers are valid. Invalid TCBs can
affect context switching, but here we focus on ensuring that
the scheduler makes the right choices.
7 By treating the field xListEnd as a normal xListItem, our
model adds two extra fields to the end marker: pvContainer
and pvOwner. However, since these fields are never accessed
for the end marker, this simplification is safe.
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two cases and depends on the predicate DLS, which
captures the shape of doubly-linked list segments. The
first disjunct captures the case where pxIndex and xLis-
tEnd point to the same entry (which is a doubly-linked
list segment identified by i); the second disjunct cap-
tures the case where they point to different segments.
Recall that the star (∗) operator represents separat-
ing conjunction and ensures that its arguments reside
in disjoint heaps (for more information about separa-
tion logic, see [29]). In both cases, the arguments that
are passed to the DLS predicate ensure that the items
are indeed in cyclic doubly-linked lists. To help under-
stand how the cyclic structure is formed, we refer the
reader to Figure 15, where a graphical representation of
these cyclic doubly-linked list segments is shown. Fig-
ure 15(a) refers to the first conjunct in the definition
of the predicate XLIST, where only one segment is used
(we name it s in the figure). Figure 15(b) refers to the
second conjunct in the definition of the predicate XLIST,
where two segments, named s1 and s2, are used: one
referenced by pxIndex (variable i) and the other one
referenced by xListEnd (variable e). The dashed lines
indicate how the circular structures are achieved.
(a) First disjunct: s is a doubly-linked circu-
lar segment
(b) Second disjunct: s1 and s2 are two con-
nected doubly-linked circular segments
Fig. 15 Graphical representation of doubly-linked list seg-
ments used in the definition of XLIST
The definition of the shape predicate DLS is:
DLS(p, pv, ob, ib)≡
p7→xListItem( , pv, ob, , ) ∧ ib=p
∨ p7→xListItem( , pv, t, , ) ∗ DLS(t, p, ob, ib)
In the definition of DLS, p is a pointer to the first el-
ement of the segment, pv is a pointer to the element
preceding the segment, ob is a pointer to the element
following the segment, and ib is a pointer to the last
element of the segment. So, to express a cyclic doubly-
linked list, we have to set p=ob and pv=ib. Using the
same graphic notation as in Figure 15, we would repre-
sent a circular doubly-linked list segment as shown in
Figure 16.
Fig. 16 Graphical representation of DLS(p, pv, ob, ib).
These predicates can be directly used in Hip/Sleek
specifications to express, for example, that the result
of a given function is a list of the shape XLIST, thus
guaranteeing that the items are arranged as a cyclic
doubly-linked list. However, since Hip/Sleek supports
the combination of shape information with numerical
information, we can be more expressive. We can, for
example, extend the shape predicates shown above with
a natural number n representing the length of the list
and with a bag B containing all the references to items
in the list that are different from the end marker.
XLIST(p, n, B)≡
p7→xList(n, i, i) ∗ DLS(i, q, i, q, n+1, B1)
∧ B = diff(B1, {i})
∨ p7→xList(n, i, e) ∗ DLS(e, e1, i, f1, m1, B1)
∗ DLS(i, f1, e, e1, m2, B2) ∧ n=m1+m2−1
∧ B = diff(union(B1, B2), {e})
DLS(p, pv, ob, ib, n, B)≡
p7→xListItem( , pv, ob, , ) ∧ ib=p ∧ n=1∧B={p}
∨ p7→xListItem( , pv, t, , ) ∗ DLS(t, p, ob, ib, n−1, B1)
∧ B = union(B1, {p})
The highlighted parts show the new numerical informa-
tion. Note how in the definition of XLIST, the bag B is
defined to exclude the end marker.
When FreeRTOS is compiled, the user has to define
statically how many priorities the scheduler will sup-
port (by defining the variable configMAX PRIORITIES ).
To simplify the verification process, we assume that we
have exactly two different priorities. Also, because the
version of Hip/Sleek that we have used only has ex-
perimental support for arrays, we encapsulate the lists
of tasks that are ready to execute in a user-defined data
node:
data readyTskLists { xList l0; xList l1;}
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The data node readyTskLists can be seen as an
array with two lists, l0 and l1. We also provide a func-
tion pxReadyTasksLists that given a priority, returns
the corresponding list of tasks ready to execute. In sum-
mary, we model the array pxReadyTasksLists as a par-
tial function and we assume the existence of only two
priorities.
4.2 On lemmas
User-defined predicates allow expressive descriptions of
data structures with complex invariants. However, we
may want to use properties of the data structures that
are not directly obtained from the user-defined predi-
cates. For example, from the definition of DLS, the ver-
ification system cannot conclude immediately that two
consecutive doubly-linked list segments can be merged
into one doubly-linked list segment. To overcome this
limitation, Hip/Sleek allows the definition of lemmas
that can be used to relate predicates beyond their orig-
inal definitions. We can express lemmas using the re-
served word coercion:
coercion appenddls
DLS(self, pre1, ob2, ib2, n1 + n2, B3)∧B3=union(B1, B2)
←
DLS(self, pre1, ob1, ib1, n1, B1) ∗
DLS(ob1, ib1, ob2, ib2, n2, B2);
This lemma, called appenddls, states that two consec-
utive segments (note how ob1 and ib1 match) can be
merged together. This lemma is necessary to verify the
function vListInsertEnd. A graphical representation of
the lemma is shown in Figure 17.
Fig. 17 Graphical representation of the lemma appenddls
Another important lemma states that a doubly-linked
list segment of size n can be decomposed into a doubly-
linked list segment of size n−1 followed by a list item
(for n≥2). We call this lemma taildls and define it as:
coercion taildls
DLS(self, prev, ob, ib, n, B) ∧ n≥2
→
DLS(self, prev, ib, nib, n−1, B1) ∗
ib7→xListItem( , nib, ob, c, o) ∧
B = union(B1, {ib});
This lemma is necessary to verify the vListRemove func-
tion, because the function links the element preceding
the item to be removed with the element following it.
Since the item to remove can be preceded by a DLS (as
in the second case of vListRemove’s precondition shown
below), we need a lemma that exposes the last element
of the DLS. A graphical representation of the lemma is
shown in Figure 18.
Fig. 18 Graphical representation of the lemma taildls
4.3 Some examples of verified properties
We now show how some of the desired properties are
verified, by discussing specifications that were success-
fully verified by Hip/Sleek.
Manipulating lists The scheduler relies on the list
API, so, in order to verify properties of the scheduler,
it is required that we verify first the methods used for
manipulating lists. In this section, we only show the
functions relevant for the scheduler, together with their
specifications. The first of these functions is vListIni-
tialise, which is used to initialise lists. Using the predi-
cates defined above, its formal specification can be writ-
ten as follows:
void vListInitialise(xList pxList)
requires pxList7→xList( , , )
ensures XLIST(pxList, 0, {})
{ · · · }
The keyword requires refers to the precondition and
the keyword ensures refers to the postcondition. The
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specification expresses that, provided that the argu-
ment pxList is a pointer to an xList structure, the
function guarantees that on termination pxList is of
the shape XLIST(pxList, 0, {}). This simple example is
included to illustrate how one aspect of memory safety
is guaranteed: the function guarantees that the list is
properly initialised with no items other than the end
marker (as illustrated in Figure 2).
Not all functions need to use shape predicates. For
example, the function vListInitialiseItem, which sets
the container of the given list item to NULL, can be
specified as:
void vListInitialiseItem(xListItem pxItem)
requires pxItem7→xListItem(v, p, q, , o)
ensures pxItem7→xListItem(v, p, q, null, o)
{ · · · }
Note how the postcondition guarantees that all the fields
remain the same, apart from the container.
As explained in Section 2, function vListInsertEnd
is relevant to the way in which the scheduler determines
which task to run next. We can specify it as follows:
void vListInsertEnd(xList pxList,
xListItem pxNewListItem)
requires XLIST(pxList, n, B) ∗
pxNewListItem 7→xListItem( , , , , o) ∗
o7→tskTCB( , , pxNewListItem, , )
ensures XLIST(pxList, n + 1, B1) ∧
B1 = union({pxNewListItem}, B) ∧
pxList.pxIndex = pxNewListItem;
{ · · · }
The precondition states that the argument pxList has
to be an XLIST of size n with elements given by bag B.
The postcondition assures that, on termination, pxList
is an XLIST of size n+1 and the argument pxNewLis-
tItem is the new element. Moreover, it states that the
field pxList.pxIndex is updated as expected. Note that
by using separating conjunction, the precondition also
states that the new element cannot already be an el-
ement of the list. If we look at the definition of the
function shown in Section 2, we see that there are no
restrictions on the item being added to the list. As
a result, if the TCB pointed by the field pxIndex is
used as an argument, the shape of the list is destroyed!
Since the list API can be used by application code, this
can be seen as a potential serious problem. However, if
our annotation is included and checked against all the
calls, we can be sure that the problem will never arise.
Hip/Sleek is quite flexible, so if we want to be more
precise about the shape of the data structures involved,
we can specify vListInsertEnd alternatively as shown
in Figure 19, where the postcondition states explic-
void vListInsertEnd(xList pxList,
xListItem pxNewListItem)
requires XLIST(pxList, n, B) ∗
pxNewListItem7→xListItem( , , , , o) ∗
o7→tskTCB( , , pxNewListItem, , )
ensures pxList7→xList(n + 1, pxNewListItem, e) ∗
DLS(e, prev, pxNewListItem, ib, n1, B1) ∗
DLS(pxNewListItem, ib, e, prev, n2, B2) ∧
n = n1 + n2− 2 ∧
∃ Bi · Bi = B1∪B2 ∧ Bi = B∪{pxNewListItem}
{ · · · }
Fig. 19 Alternative specification of the function vListInser-
tEnd
itly that pxNewListItem can be seen as doubly-linked
list segment adjacent to the doubly-linked list segment
pxList. We could be even more specific and state in the
postcondition that the TCB pointed by o is unchanged.
Note that the preconditions above include a refer-
ence to a tskTCB named o that is never used in the
postconditions. We have to include it, because in the
last line of the function, the field pvContainer is derefer-
enced (see Section 2). This can be seen as another exam-
ple of memory safety: Hip/Sleek cannot verify func-
tions that try to insert a list item with a null pvOwner
field.
Finally, the function vListRemove can be specified
as follows:
void vListRemove(xListItem pxItemToRemove)
requires c 7→xList(n, pxItemToRemove, e) ∗
DLS(e, prev, pxItemToRemove, ib1, n1, B1) ∗
DLS(pxItemToRemove, ib1, e, prev, n2, B2) ∧
n = n1 + n2− 1
or c 7→xList(n, p, e) ∗ DLS(e, prev, p, ib1, n1, B1) ∗
DLS(p, ib1, pxItemToRemove, ib2, n2, B2) ∗
DLS(pxItemToRemove, ib2, e, prev, n3, B3) ∧
n = n1 + n2 + n3− 1
ensures XLIST(c, n− 1, ) ∗
pxItemToRemove7→xListItem( , , , , );
{ · · · }
The cases in the precondition arise because the item to
be removed can be the one pointed by the field pxIndex.
The postcondition guarantees that the size of the list
is decreased and that the list and the item to remove
reside in separate parts of memory.
In our experiments, we have tweaked this specifica-
tion to minimize the search space and leverage on proof
splitting. The specification that we used is semantically
the same, but it is divided into six different cases (each
case depends on whether the item to be removed is the
one pointed by pxIndex and whether pxIndex and the
end marker of the list are empty). We include more
details about performance tuning in Section 6.
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Picking the next task The function shown in Figure
10 is where the task that runs next is selected. It can
be specified as follows:
void list GET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY(ref tskTCB pxTCB,
xList pxList)
requires XLIST(pxList, , B)
ensures XLIST(pxList, , B) ∗
pxTCB′ 7→tskTCB( , , gli, , ) ∧ gli ∈ B
{ · · · }
The primed variable pxTCB′ denotes the value of the
pointer pxTCB after execution of the function. The spec-
ification expresses that given an argument list pxList
with the tasks contained in the bag B, the return value
pxTCB′ is guaranteed to be a task that is in the bag B.
The field gli in the specification refers to the xListItem
field that is used to place a TCB in a list (as mentioned
before in section 2). This is another example of mem-
ory safety certification: the pointer to the task chosen
by the scheduler to execute next will certainly point to
a task in the list of tasks ready to execute and will never
point to the end marker.
Although list GET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY is
the function responsible for the change of the running
TCB, it is called by the function vTaskSwitchContext,
which is executed after each clock tick. Assuming that
l0 and l1 are lists of tasks ready to execute with prior-
ities 0 and 1, respectively, we can specify vTaskSwitch-
Context as:
xList vTaskSwitchContext()
requires rtl7→readyTskLists(l0, l1) ∗
XLIST(l0, , ) ∗ XLIST(l1, , ) ∧
uxTopReadyPriority = 0
ensures res = l0
requires rtl7→readyTskLists(l0, l1) ∗
XLIST(l0, , ) ∗ XLIST(l1, , ) ∧
uxTopReadyPriority = 1
ensures res = l1
{ · · · }
The specification states that if the highest priority of
the tasks ready to execute is 0 (i.e., uxTopReadyPriority
is 0), then the list that is chosen is l0. Otherwise, l1 is
chosen. It has to be said that to simplify the verification,
we have changed the function to return the list that is
chosen; in the original code, the type of the function is
void.
Adding new tasks The function used to add new
tasks to the list of tasks ready to execute is prvAd-
dTaskToReadyQueue, which can be specified as follows:
void prvAddTaskToReadyQueue(ref tskTCB pxTCB)
requires pxTCB7→tskTCB( , , gli, , 0) ∗
gli7→xListItem( , , , , pxTCB) ∗
rtl7→readyTskLists(l0, l1) ∗
XLIST(l0, , ) ∗ XLIST(l1, , )
ensures DLS(gli, ib, e, prev, , ) ∗
l07→xList( , gli, e) ∗
DLS(e, prev, gli, ib, , ) ∧
uxTopReadyPriority′≥0
requires pxTCB7→tskTCB( , , gli, , 1) ∗
gli7→xListItem( , , , , pxTCB) ∗
rtl7→readyTskLists(l0, l1) ∗
XLIST(l0, , ) ∗ XLIST(l1, , )
ensures DLS(gli, ib, e, prev, , ) ∗
l17→xList( , gli, e) ∗
DLS(e, prev, gli, ib, , ) ∧
uxTopReadyPriority′≥1
{ · · · }
The specification states that the TCB is added to the
list associated with its priority and the global variable
uxTopReadyPriority is updated accordingly.
Removing tasks As explained before, the scheduler
uses vListRemove to remove a task from the list of tasks
ready to execute. This function is described above.
Functions that manipulate global variables Some
important functions related with scheduling are con-
trolled by manipulating global variables. Although these
functions do not pose any challenge to the verification
process, we include here two examples to show how they
can be verified. The two examples shown are the func-
tions vTaskSuspendAll and vTaskEndScheduler.
The function vTaskSuspendAll suspends all the tasks
and the only command it performs is to increment by 1
a global variable named uxSchedulerSuspended. Hence,
we can specify it as:
void vTaskSuspendAll()
requires uxSchedulerSuspended≥0
ensures uxSchedulerSuspended′ =
uxSchedulerSuspended + 1
{ · · · }
The precondition states that the value of uxScheduler-
Suspended has to be a natural number; the postcondi-
tion guarantees that its value is incremented by 1. (The
initial value of the variable is zero, so the precondition
is satisfied initially.)
The function vTaskEndScheduler terminates the sched-
uler by setting the global variable xSchedulerRunning
to false. We can specify it as:
void vTaskEndScheduler()
requires true
ensures !xSchedulerRunning′
{ · · · }
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The precondition is true, meaning that the function
can be called at any time without any restrictions. The
postcondition states that the new value of xScheduler-
Running’ is false.
4.4 Verification statistics
We finish by presenting some verification statistics as-
sociated with the functions discussed in this section.
In Table 1 we summarise the annotation overhead of
the functions discussed. The first column identifies the
function, the second column refers to the size of the
function (measures in lines of code), and the third col-
umn refers to the number of lines of annotations (we
also include the annotation overhead percentage). To
improve readability, we abbreviate the function name
list GET OWNER OF NEXT ENTRY to list GOONE.
Function Size Annotations
vListInitialise 5 2 (+40%)
vListInitialiseItem 1 2 (+200%)
vListInsertEnd 9 13 (+144%)
vListRemove 14 15 (+107%)
list GOONE 5 2 (+40%)
vTaskSwitchContext 32 4 (+13%)
prvAddTaskToReadyQueue 8 4 (+50%)
vTaskSuspendAll 1 2 (+200%)
vTaskEndScheduler 1 2 (+200%)
Totals 76 46 (+61%)
Table 1 Annotation overhead of the functions discussed.
The size of each function and the annotations column are
measured in lines of code.
Table 1 shows that as the size of functions grow,
the annotation overhead decreases. The overhead as-
sociated with one-liners will always be at least 200%,
because we need to provide a pre- and a post-condition
(and we write pre- and post-conditions in two separate
lines). Note that if we remove the three one-liners, the
overall overhead decreases from 61% to 55%.
The overhead associated with shape predicates and
data structures is smaller than the overhead associated
with functions. The data structures discussed in this
paper use 35 lines of code and the shape predicates are
written in 6 lines; this represents an overhead of 17%.
However, if we include the 4 lines used for lemmas, the
overhead is very similar to the one obtained for the
functions: 29%.
Although in general the overhead decreases as the
size of the functions grow, these results suggest that
for large code bases, manually writing the annotations
is not a scalable approach and can become difficult to
manage. In Section 6, we briefly discuss how this could
improve.
Table 2 presents the verification time for each of the
functions discussed. Our test platform is a GNU/Linux
server (Debian 3.2.46-1) with 8 cores Intel Core i7 CPU
(8MB Cache, 2.93GHz) and with 16GB of RAM. The
times are measured in seconds and were achieved using
the main branch of the prototype Hip/Sleek compiled
natively. We used MONA for proving properties involv-
ing bags and Omega for all other numerical properties
(we used Hip/Sleek’s option -tp om). The table dis-
plays the median value of five measurements. The times
associated with functions vListInsertEnd and vListRemove
are considerably higher than all the other times, due to
the big search space that arises from the use of the
shape predicates XLIST and DLS.
Function Verification time
vListInitialise 0.27s
vListInitialiseItem 0.10s
vListInsertEnd 130.20s
vListRemove 814.75s
list GOONE 0.60s
vTaskSwitchContext 0.19s
prvAddTaskToReadyQueue 0.34s
vTaskSuspendAll 0.10s
vTaskEndScheduler 0.11s
Table 2 Verification times of the functions discussed (in sec-
onds).
Overall, given that Hip/Sleek is a research tool,
we consider that the verification times are satisfactory.
However, when disjunctions are included in the spec-
ification, the verification time is less than satisfactory
(as can be observed with the function vListRemove).
These results suggest that for large code bases, where
disjunctive specifications are likely to be used, the ver-
ification times can easily become less than satisfactory.
Techniques like the one described in [9], where disjunc-
tive formulae are pruned when unfolding shape pred-
icates, can be used to achieve better results. Another
approach that can achieve better verification times is
to divide the search space in disjoint parts and run the
verification in parallel for each of them.
5 Related Work
Much work has been done on the verification of operat-
ing systems; see [17] for an overview on the topic. Here,
we focus on RTOSs, on separation logic, and on FreeR-
TOS. Verification of RTOSs has been identified as one
of the grand challenges in software verification [33]. A
number of tools have been developed to verify real sys-
tem tools. A notable project on verification of RTOSs
is Astre´e [6], which proves no run-time error in the
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electric flight-control code for the A380. Astre´e de-
tects numeric error and overflows, but with the restric-
tion that no dynamic memory allocation is in the pro-
gram code. Other tools, like Slam [3] and Blast [12],
have been used to ensure that device drivers satisfy
the requirement of system APIs. However, these tools
do not handle memory safety properties. Various other
RTOSs claim to be formally verified, such as OpenCom-
RTOS has been verified by Verhulst et al. [32]. Bau-
mann et al. [4] uses deductive techniques to verify the
correctness of the PikeOS system. However, these works
only focus on the functional correctness of the systems,
but not the memory safety properties. Finally, a com-
plete verification of the seL4 microkernel is described
in [18]. The verification uses the interactive prover Is-
abelle/HOL [24] and establishes the correspondence be-
tween an abstract specification and a low-level concrete
C representation of the system (that was modelled in
Isabelle/HOL and manually written by the authors).
The work on seL4 is claimed to be the first-ever general-
purpose OS kernel that has been verified and is indeed
much more general than the work presented here. An-
other major difference is that our goal was never to
write the C code for a verified OS kernel, but rather to
verify an existing one.
Separation logic has been adopted by a number of
tools to verify the memory safety of system code, such
as SmallFoot [5], SpaceInvader [34] and THOR [21].
However, most of these tools support only a limited
set of predicates, which limits the capability to verify
the full functional correctness of system code. Finally,
a closely related work in progress is reported in [22],
where the authors discuss different approaches that can
be used to verify FreeRTOS. Particularly relevant is
their use of Verifast [14], a verification system based on
separation logic. Although they do not present any de-
tails or annotations, it would be interesting, as future
work, to compare their annotations with ours.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper shows how the combination of shape and
numerical information can be used to specify and ver-
ify key properties of the scheduler of FreeRTOS. The
results confirm that Hip/Sleek can indeed be used to
automatically verify important properties of production
code. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first code-
level verification of memory safety and functional cor-
rectness properties of the FreeRTOS scheduler. Since
the properties that we verify are quite general, we en-
visage that the same approach can be adopted to verify
the scheduler of other operating systems.
6.1 Lessons learned
Verification of real-world code used in production is
a very time-consuming process. The verification was
initiated by the first author as an exercise in auto-
mated verification of real-world code. Although he has
a background in formal methods, he was not familiar
with FreeRTOS and he had no previous experience with
Hip/Sleek. Therefore, he experienced a steep learning
curve and got stuck a few times dealing with some of
Hip/Sleek’s idiosyncrasies; the other authors provided
guidance whenever needed. The project took approx-
imately six man-months. The verification progressed
quite slowly for several reasons. First, understanding
how FreeRTOS works in enough detail to be able to
identify and verify relevant properties took approxi-
mately one man-month. Most of the time was spent
modelling the data structures involved (i.e., identifying
and refining shape predicates) and annotating the code.
A second reason is that we needed to convert the orig-
inal C code to Hip notation, and there are aspects we
need to take into account other than the specifications.
Some of the conversions were purely syntactic: for ex-
ample, all the field accesses of the form var→field had to
be rewritten as var.field and C macros had to be rewrit-
ten as functions. However, some conversions were not so
trivial: for example, Hip does not support type conver-
sions and casts, so we had to carefully rewrite the code
to avoid them (e.g., to avoid casts from xMiniListItem
to xListItem, we decided to model the field xListEnd as
a xListItem; this required a careful check to make sure
that in this context, the fields pvOwner and pvCon-
tainer were not accessed). Third, because Hip/Sleek
is under active development and has different branches
with disjoint features, we were unable to use simultane-
ously some of these features (for example, for the work
described in this paper, we initially used a stable ver-
sion which did not include support for lemmas).
A considerable amount of time was also spent on
performance tuning. In particular, i) tweaking the spec-
ifications to minimize the search space and leverage
on proof splitting; ii) constraining lemma applications
to precise points and forcing formula transformations
through no-op method calls; and iii) improving the ef-
ficiency of the pure provers by adding a customized
pointer constraint solving procedure.
First, during the specification process we observed
that for seemingly small variations in specification struc-
ture the verification timings vary wildly. As Sleek was
designed as a fully automatic entailment checker, it
is built with a comprehensive search strategy. As dis-
cussed earlier, in some cases, by explicitly forcing an
unfold or a fold operation within a method specifica-
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tion we were able to reduce the timings considerably
by reducing the inherent search space. As a further
performance adjustment, we introduced annotations on
the pure constraints that identify the distinct proper-
ties captured by the predicates, in this case, pointer
(dis-)equalities, list sizes and set of elements in order
to leverage on the tool’s ability to split the proofs in
distinct, independent sub-proofs which were inherently
faster.
Secondly, we leveraged on the method call mecha-
nism to force the verifier to transform the current state.
To this end, we inserted at key points, method calls
to functions with an empty body whose pre and post
conditions were syntactically different but semantically
equivalent. While operationally such a call is a no-op
statement, in the verification process it induced a state
transformation by forcing an entailment of specifica-
tions given for the stub method. The gain was two fold:
first, such transformations lead to a simpler expression
of the current state after the method call; second, by
constructing stub functions that encapsulate the lemma
effect we were able to remove the presence of lemmas
during the main verification effort which led to further
pruning of the search space. In order to maintain the
soundness of the verification we applied the verification
system to prove the correctness of the no-op functions,
in the presence of the required lemmas. We note that
such transformations are not equivalent to the mecha-
nisms they mimic as the general mechanisms are built
in the entailment checker and can be automatically ap-
plied in the proving process while the no-op functions
have a much more restricted scope: they are applied
only when explicitly called by the programmer in the
method body. Nevertheless, they can help with tuning
the verification performance.
Finally, in the process of verifying these specifica-
tions, we observed that in many cases the generated
proof obligations would accumulate a large number of
pointer equality and disequality constraints which would
be passed down to the pure provers leading to large
proving times. To alleviate the problem, we introduced
in the Sleek checker a specialized decision procedure
for these two types of constraints. Thus, by calling the
new checker whenever possible, instead of more power-
ful provers like Omega or Mona, we achieve a large drop
in the verification times, up to seven fold for particular
examples.
6.2 Future Work
We plan to verify other components of FreeRTOS, but
it is still unclear how certain fairness and timing prop-
erties can be verified. For example, at the moment, we
cannot use Hip/Sleek to prove that a task scheduled
to run at moment t will run at moment t+∆t (we plan
to use the work described in [10] as a starting point
to extend our prototype). Also, a challenging problem
is to verify that the queue accesses are indeed thread-
safe (this implies reasoning about interrupts, which is
known to be a difficult problem).
Another direction that we want to pursuit is related
with inference and scalability. Although the specifica-
tions written so far have been supplied by us, recent de-
velopments [25,26,28,27] in Hip/Sleek will allow the
automatic inference of properties, making our approach
more scalable.
We plan to use recent work done on Hip/Sleek
[31] to verify code based on overlaid structures [19,20],
which are structures that contain nodes for multiple
data structures and these links are intended to be used
at the same time. For example, in FreeRTOS, a task
can be simultaneously in two lists and when it is re-
moved from one of them, it also has to be removed
from the other (an example is the function xTaskRe-
moveFromEventList).
Finally, as we verify other components of FreeR-
TOS, we will certainly gain more in-depth knowledge
about the system. This means that specifications will
possibly be refined and improved. By tackling some of
these challenges, we hope to develop new theory results
and to extend Hip/Sleek.
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